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Book Reviews 
Life and Death with Liberty and Justice 
Germain Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle, Jr. 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 1979. x + 521 pp. , $20.95. 
Life and Death with Liberty and Justice is a comprehensive critical examina-
tion by two professional philosophers of the major issues involved in the current 
euthanasia debate. Grisez holds the chair of Christian ethics at Mount Saint Mary's 
College and Seminary , Emmitsburg, Md. Boyle is currently a philosophy professo r 
at the College of Saint Thomas, Saint Paul, Minn. The book includes,13 chapters 
of which chapters two through nine are devoted to a jurisprudential treatment of 
the issues. In chapter two a basis for the forthcoming treatment is established on 
the principles of liberty and justice. The discussion in chapters t hree through nine 
concerns what the appropriate legislation in the U ni ted States should be for issues 
such as "the definition of death ," "refusal of m edical treatment ," " suic ide," 
"voluntary and involuntary euthanasia" and "care for the noncompetent patient." 
Chapter ten considers defects in American constitutional law which were revealed 
in t he earlier jurisprudential discussion. Chapters eleven and twelve examine the 
principal issues from a moral or ethical point of view. In the final chapter of the 
book the authors compare and contrast their own views on the relation between 
law and morali ty with utilitarianism. They also attempt to show here how the 
ethical theory established in chapter eleven gives additional rational support to the 
justice and liberty jurispruden tial framework worked out in the second chapter. 
Although both authors collaborated on the entire work, Grisez appears to be 
its principal author. This seems to be clearly the situation for the jurisprudential 
part of t he work. Overall, this book is a clearly written , thoroughly researched 
(throu gh July, 1977), incisive, critical analysis of the current debate on euthanasia 
from the legal and ethical perspectives. The authors make an obvious effort to give 
a fair and temperate hearing to all sides of a particular issue and the more than 50 
pages of notes at the end of the book attest to the extensive research which went 
into the proj ect. There is an index, but no special bibliographical section . 
Although t he argu m ent developed in t he book is philosophical in character and 
thus of interest to any philosopher concerned with the lega lity and morality of 
questions pertinent to euthanasia, Grisez and Boyle have written especially for all 
those "who doubt the wisdom of legalizing the killing of one person by another 
not now permitted by Anglo-Saxon law. " The authors hope to provide these 
people with a "well argued and unified strategy" for defending human life in the 
prac tica l order as effectively as possible. The book, in brief, is a serious profes-
sional effort by pro-life philosophers Grisez and Boyl e to give a practical wisdom 
to the pro-life movement and thereby help it make a substantive case in the public 
arena based upon jurisprudential and ethical grounds, rather than on' religious or 
theological ones. 
It is both interesting and significant in light of this that the authors rest their 
jurisprudentia l case on the concepts of justice and liberty rather than on the 
"sanctity of life " standard usually advocated by people in the pro-life movement. 
Grisez an d Boyle believe that any use of t he latter in public debate would make 
one vulnerable to a charge of "question begging" since there ex ists no consensus 
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in American society on "the sanctity of life." Life from that perspective is simply 
not a direct, immediate and absolute part of the common good, for the sake of 
which Americans have forged themselves into a political entity. But a rationally 
sound jurisprudence can be based upon the concepts of justice and liberty, the 
authors claim, because analysis reveals that "justice - including fair respect for 
liberty - is the one component of the common good that is constant and neces-
sary." Justice with liberty is then the standard which any party to the euthanasia 
jurisprudential debate must accept if it claims to argue its case in reference to the 
American legal and political perspective. If Grisez and Boyle are correct in their 
views that justice with liberty is a more rationally justified jurisprudential stand-
ard than "sanctity of life" and that this standard rests or is supported by a solid 
ethical foundation (chapters eleven and thirteen), then the pro-life movement 
would probably lose little and gain much by using "justice with liberty" rather 
than "sanctity of life" as the standard for its jurisprudential arguments. With the 
possible exception of some system of "living will" which could be legalized under 
justice with liberty, a jurisprudence based upon the latter would appear to cor-
respond with most other legislative objectives of the pro-life movement. 
In any case, to focus critically on some major issues treated in the jurispru-
dential part of the book, the authors contend that a sound system of law based 
upon the principles of justice and liberty will properly designate any form of 
active euthanasia, whether voluntary or non voluntary , as unlawful homicide. Turn-
ing first to active voluntary euthanasia, it is argued that physicians should not be 
at liberty to perform this kind of killing because at least some people not wishing 
to be killed are likely to become unwilling euthanasia victims if active voluntary 
euthanasia without close governmental regulation were legally permitted. These 
people would obviously be unjustly denied the protection they now enjoy under 
anti-homicide laws, since the denial would function to serve a private interest 
alone. Grisez and Boyle, however, go beyond this familiar slippery slope or wedge 
anti-euthanasia argument to make their point, by claiming that any voluntary 
active euthanasia would be unjust even if it were effectively controlled under tight 
government supervision. In this situation the liberty of "the many people who still 
consider euthanasia killing a grave moral evil" would be unjustly infringed upon, 
they argue, since the tight governmental regulation would necessarily make them 
unwilling participants in a government process which functions to serve a private 
interest alone. 
This argument is interesting because the authors admit that something more 
than the often-used slippery slope defense may be necessary to justify the 
infringement of liberty effected by legislation prohibiting any form of voluntary 
active euthanasia. It is not clear, however (at least not to this reviewer), that the 
"something more" based upon involuntary coercion offered by Grisez and Boyle 
is sufficient to plug the hole they perceive in the slippery slope argument. Would 
legislation permitting active voluntary euthanasia necessarily serve private interests 
solely? Do the many people referred to, who consider voluntary active euthanasia 
a grave moral evil, really consider it to be a grave moral evil in all circumstances? 
Or is the euthanasia context similar to the abortion one, where many of those 
opposed to legalized abortion are not opposed to legalized abortion to preserve 
the life of the mother? The fact that these questions can be raised meaningfully in 
reference to Grisez and Boyle's argument suggests that pro-lifers who accept their 
evaluation of the slippery slope defense might have to do more than is done in the 
book to make a strong case against any legislation permitting active voluntary 
euthanasia. 
The authors supply a less problematic case when opposing legislation permit-
ting active nonvoluntary euthanasia. They believe that a distinct argument is neces-
sary to handle this form of euthanasia since they admit that the killing to be done 
in this context could possibly serve a public interest. It could, for example, cut 
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the high costs incurred from providing health care to noncompetent citizens who 
are seriously ill and show no reasonable promise for improvement. Two sub-
stantive reasons are given which show why any legalized killing of this sort would 
necessarily be unjust. In the first place, all the various kinds of killing in Anglo-
American law which have jurisprudential justification to do so because the killing 
either "protects the rights of others and the rule of law from being overridden by 
brute force " or it "provides the best possibility of survival when some members of 
a group must be sacrificed to save the lives of others." Obviously none of these 
contexts provide any precedent for legalizing the killing involved in active non-
voluntary euthanasia. Secondly and, I think, decisively, any institutionalization of 
active nonvoluntary euthanasia will function unjustly from an arbitrary cutoff 
point differentiating those to be killed from those to be saved, as well as from an 
arbitrary discrimination in the practical application of the category which permits 
the killing of borderline cases. 
In the ethical component of the book, it is clear that Grisez and Boyle give no 
quarter whatsoever when arguing the issues of euthanasia from the moral or 
ethical perspective in chapters eleven and twelve. For them, any proposal to bring 
about death as a means to end suffering, whether by omission or commission, is, if 
adopted and executed, an instance of killing in the strict sense and can never be 
morally justified. This contention is especially tough-minded because in addition 
to condemning active euthanasia it also means that any instance of withholding or 
withdrawing treatment which has been decided upon because "the patient will be 
better off dead" is also a killing not justified from the moral point of view, 
regardless of the good wills of the people involved. If Grisez and Boyle are correct 
here , then possibly some, and perhaps much of what is accepted in our society as 
morally justified so-called passive euthanasia is simply no different objectively 
from any other moral act of murder. 
This moral position on euthanasia derives basically from two factors : a funda-
mental normative moral principle and the basic intrinsic goodness of human life. 
The fundamental normative principle is this: "one ought always to act on these 
potentialities conducive to fuller and fullest self-fulfillment" and it is naturally 
rooted in the normativeness of all the basic human goods taken together. The 
authors argue that human goods as such ground this principle because each good 
in itself is not only an obvious value, existing in reference to the network of 
human potentiality for self-flourishing, but is also a value which is incommen-
surable. Thus, all basic human goods are qualitatively equal with no one of them 
being the inferior or superior of any others, at least not in the practical order. The 
feature of incommensurability involved here is established from the fact of free 
choice. If basic human goods were qualitatively different one would be psycholog-
ically determined in a given context to choose the best: "what one ought to do 
will be identical with what one will do." The fact of the matter, however - the 
fact of freedom - is that one is perfectly capable of doing other than what he or 
she knows ought to be done. Thus what provides the fatal blow to all consequen-
tialist ethical theories opens the door for the basic principle of natural law: act 
always in ways which are open to the basic human goods and never act in ways 
which violate any of them (precisely because each is an incommensurable good). 
The argument to establish the basic normative principle involved here is more a 
crystallization of positions Grisez and Boyle have developed in earlier writings 
than it is something completely new. In fact, some of these earlier writings have 
already generated a challenge from pro-life ethicists who, while admitting in prin-
ciple Grisez's and Boyl e 's point on incommensurability, deny that basic human 
goods are necessarily incommensurable in every context. 
Grisez and Boyle think that their claim about the intrinsic goodness of human 
life is true because the opposing view - that it is an extrinsic good necessary for 
the possession of the basic goods, such as knowledge of truth and experience of 
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beauty - entails dualism and dualism is a false position. Few people will deny that 
dualism is false, but dualism may be a red h erring here . Perhaps the point at issue 
really concerns the extent to which the human biological body as we know it is an 
intrinsic good of a human person. It appears that for Grisez and Boyle the cover· 
age extends to the entire biological body: arms and legs, heart and lungs. The 
compelling quality of their account may not be seen or felt , however, as one looks 
for the intrinsic good in the total human biological body of the self-respirating but 
brain-damaged person who is living out his life in an irreversible comatose state. 
The service that Grisez and Boyle provide to the pro-life movement through 
Life and Death with Liberty and Justice should be reiterated. It will surely be 
advantageous for furthering pro-life objectives if people within the movement give 
the book the careful study it deserves. 
- Patrick J. Coffey, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Philosophy 
Marquette University 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress 
Oxford University Press, New York, N. Y., 1979. x + 314 pp., $7. 95 (paper). 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics is an innovative book. Until now, most efforts 
to treat the full range of moral issues in medicine from the standpoint of a 
systematic moral theory have been provided by authors writing in one of the 
major theological traditions. This volume represents an attempt by moralists with 
scholarly facility in 20th century philosophical ethics to construct a set of moral 
principles for use in analyzing a broad spectrum of ethical dilemmas in health 
care. The philosophical elegance of the principles is commendable. Somewhat less 
satisfactory, however, is the manner in which the principles are applied to clinical 
medicine. What the volume seems to lack is a firm sense for some important 
philosophical lessons regarding the physician-patient relationship which clinical 
experience provides. 
The authors propose to examine medico-moral issues primarily from the per-
spective of four principles: autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice. 
Certain other principles, sometimes thought to be sui generis, are derived from 
some member of this set. For example, the duty of veracity is derived from the 
principle of autonomy. Autonomy requires consent by the patient or subject, and 
"consent cannot express autonomy unless it is informed, and it therefore depends 
on communication and ultimately on truthtelling" (p. 203). However, duties of 
fidelity, which are also a significant feature of professional-patient relationships, 
are created by voluntary actions such as the making of contracts. Oftentimes they 
"hinge on the terms of the relationship itself rather than on external principles" 
(p. 201). The various principles formulate prima facie duties - they indicate 
duties that "are on all occasions binding unless they are in conflict wi th stronger 
duties" (p. 45). Thus, the interpretation of principles, as well as some of their 
content, derives from W. D. Ross. 
Each of the centrally important middle chapters focuses upon one of the four 
major principles. In each case, the relevant principle is explicated and then used to 
examine bioethical issues to which it is deemed to be most relevant. Although the 
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